Opinion The Ukraine war is a slugfest that Ukrainians will winhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/20/ukraine-military-strategy-adaptation-victory/
Ukrainian soldiers take part in a trench-warfare training exercise on Thursday in Britain.
Retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling commanded the 1st Armored Division during the Iraq surge and later commanded U.S. Army Europe.Looks have always been deceiving when it comes to Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression in Ukraine. From the start, Russia’s capacities were overestimated. Both the size of its army, and the modernization it had supposedly undergone indicated to many observers that Russia would triumph easily. But since the invasion began, the Russian military has failed to adapt its strategy and operational objectives to battle conditions and circumstances.
Today, ahead of the one-year anniversary of the conflict, coverage of the war’s battles mostly focuses on the fighting along the central and southern front, with cities such as Bakhmut and Vuhledar dominating headlines. Russia has been making small gains at great human cost to its troops around the former, and has squandered thousands of its soldiers for nothing at the latter. This might look like an emerging stalemate, but it is anything but. It is, in fact, a slugfest.
The war has gone through five phases and, through each one, Ukraine’s forces have significantly outperformed Russia’s, in no small part because of a military culture of adaptability. Russian forces continue to be hampered by a lack of that very same culture, as well as by a lack of leadership and initiative.
During my time as commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe, I got to know Ukrainian leaders and soldiers during various training missions, and saw this culture of adaptability grow and develop. I also had the opportunity to closely watch Russia “demonstrate” (but not properly train or exercise) its military capacity on several occasions, and frequently noted the deep and pervasive corruption that bedeviled its armed forces.
So, before even knowing the details of Putin’s strategy or his military’s operational objectives, I knew immediately the invasion would not end well for the Russian leader. “Ukraine will fight above its weight class,” I told a colleague on the first night of the war. “And Russia will be embarrassed.”
Opinions on the war in Ukraine after one year
One year ago, Russia invaded Ukraine. Post Opinions is marking the anniversary with columns looking at all that has transpired and what may lie ahead.Putin never officially announced his strategic goals. To try to understand what his generals might do, I tried to ascertain what those might be. He seemed to want regime change in Kyiv, the destruction of Ukraine’s army, the subjugation of Ukraine’s population, control of the Black and Azov Sea ports (and perhaps of Moldova, as well). It was obvious Russia didn’t have the number of soldiers or the combined arms effectiveness to achieve Putin’s ambitious war aims.
Worse, Putin’s army ignored one of the most important principles of war: unity of command. The generals planned an attack on nine different axes of advance, but were never able to coordinate ample naval and air forces into a massed assault.
The war started on Feb. 24. It took about six weeks for Phase 1 of Putin’s campaign to fail.
On April 2, Putin was forced to try a different approach. He shifted Russian forces to the east, while placing new generals in charge. But he did little to address the damage inflicted on the army by such a catastrophic beginning. Estimates vary, but up to 40 percent of front-line Russian combat units appear to have been mauled, with supply lines and effective command decimated. Putin moved most of his army east, and subsequently ordered his army to be rebuilt in weeks. Any general familiar with the physical and psychological demands associated with regeneration of a force this severely degraded would tell you this would not work.
On April 18, Putin launched a new Russian offensive in the east — the start of Phase 2 of the war. New arrows and circles were drawn on Russian maps, but the Russian generals and their troops on the ground continued to underperform. There was no meaningful adaptation and no attempt to learn hard lessons from earlier setbacks. Pieced-together, low-morale units were thrown into the fight with little planning, bad reconnaissance and ineffective battlefield leadership. Ukraine, on the other hand, was not complacent. Its generals were fast learners, and Ukrainian soldiers were innovative and adaptive. The Russian forces continued to suffer huge losses.
Phase 3 began in July and lasted through September. Ukraine’s army forced a large-scale withdrawal in the northeast in the Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, using small-scale counterattacks directed at just the right locations, aided by a large-scale operational deception in the south. Ukrainian special operations forces also contributed significantly to this phase, using stealth and disciplined operational security to ensure that Russia was embarrassed behind its own lines. For most of the summer, the Russians sustained casualties that far exceeded those suffered during the disastrous Phase 1 and 2.
Phase 4 began in late September, when Putin announced that several of the partially occupied southern regions of Ukraine would undergo annexation. This was accompanied by Putin’s order to mobilize an additional 300,000 Russians for the fight. The referendums in the occupied territories, in preparation for months, were met with an effective insurgency by Ukraine’s population and territorial forces, and were delayed multiple times. And the mobilization, while successful in bringing a limited number of “fresh” but unwilling soldiers to the front line, was still plagued by the same deficiencies that characterized Russia’s war effort from the start. The mobilizations were rushed and improvised, recruits were poorly trained and equipped, and Russian leadership was still lacking.
In contrast, Ukraine’s actions during this period consisted of an impressively coordinated use of conventional forces that had successfully incorporated newly arrived Western weapons, most notably precision-guided artillery and rockets. In addition, this phase featured more Ukrainian special operations activity, and the continued use of territorial resistance fighters. Russia responded to all this by lobbing missiles into densely packed Ukrainian cities to target critical infrastructure and Ukrainian civilians. The war crimes committed by Russian leadership and their forces continued.
Since December, we have been in Phase 5 of this war. Though the front might not have moved much, there has been significant fighting and extensive casualties on both sides. This phase is best understood not as a stalemate, but as Ukraine struggling to survive a Russian onslaught. Putin continues his messy mobilization and is sending fresh cannon fodder (or “cannon meat,” as Russians call these wretches) at Ukrainian lines in assault waves.
Ukrainian generals have balanced limited but continuous counterattacks with an active defense, while also being forced to allocate scarce air-defense capabilities to protect civilians. Ukrainian forces are also continuing to conduct intelligence operations to identify targets they will likely strike in the near future. It’s a delicate balance for the decision-makers in Kyiv. They are trying to hold the defensive lines while training and equipping their forces with newly obtained, advanced Western materiel that will make a qualitative difference in the looming counteroffensive.
Ukraine’s armed forces have admirably adapted in each phase of this fight, learning lessons from training they received over the last decade, and from the scars earned on the battlefield itself. And Russia has repeatedly demonstrated an inability to do the same.
It will remain difficult for Russia to change — simply because it can’t. A nation’s army is drawn from its people, and a nation’s army reflects the character and values of the society. While equipment, doctrine, training and leadership are important qualities of any army, the essence of a fighting force comes from what the nation represents. Putin’s autocratic kleptocracy is thus far proving no match for Ukraine’s agile democracy.
War in Ukraine: What you need to knowThe latest: Fighting in eastern Ukraine continues as Russian forces make minor gains in their attempt to encircle the city of Bakhmut. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has asked Western allies for fighter jets as Russia mounts a spring offensive.
The fight: Russia has been targeting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure with missile and drone strikes since October, often knocking out electricity, heating and water in the country. Despite heavy fighting, no side has made significant gains for months. Western allies agreed to a new wave of elaborate weapons, including Leopard tanks, hoping it may change the balance on the battlefield.On surprise trip to Kyiv, Biden vows enduring support for Ukrainehttps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/20/president-biden-kyiv-ukraine-visit-war/KYIV, Ukraine — President Biden made a dramatic, unannounced visit to Kyiv on Monday, in a display of robust American support for Ukraine just four days before the anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion.
The high-risk visit to the historic Ukrainian capital — where air raid sirens blared as Biden walked the streets with President Volodymyr Zelensky — signaled continued commitment from the United States, the largest financial and military backer of Ukraine’s effort to repel Russian invaders from its territory.
Biden was spotted with the Ukrainian leader outside St. Michael’s Golden-Domed Monastery shortly before noon local time, his appearance capping hours of speculation during an intense security lockdown that had blocked car traffic and even pedestrians from parts of central Kyiv.
Following talks with Zelensky and a visit to the U.S. Embassy, Biden departed Kyiv several hours later, according to a reporter traveling with him. Biden’s visit, however brief, represented one of the most remarkable presidential trips in modern history, sending him into a country at war and a city under regular bombardment without the heavy U.S. military presence that provided a protective shield during previous stops in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Biden and Zelensky in Kyiv on Monday. Biden went to a country at war without a heavy U.S. military presence for protection. (Evan Vucci/AP)
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